Cramer v/s Cramer

Atleast we know that the blame game is well and truly on. Having recently finished (in the span of under 2 days might i add) John Perkins 'confessions of an EHM' and its sequel, i can't admit to actually wanting to write this. In fact, had it not been for my noticing Jim Cramer's fabulous outburst courtesy youtube (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wtjkWJzxdQU), i might as well have been fast asleep by now.

So the fed's statement will be out by the time i wake up and it's safe to claim that ever since i understood how the interest rate made a difference, it has not changed from its 5.25%.
I have more respect for Mr. Bernanke than i do for the remaining American economists but i was aghast to know that when he was nominated 2 years ago, he had vehemently stated, "If I am confirmed to this position, my first priority will be to maintain consistency and continuity with the policies established during the Greenspan years." Needless to say, tomorrow's decision will go a long way in defining Bernanke's legacy at the fed and showcase his real intent.

While most conservatives argue that Greenspan would have never allowed the weakness to spread in the Dow, i can claim with absolute conviction that not many would be willing to bet on the fed's decision tomorrow. Either which way, it cane be attacked and either which way, it can defend itself. Not changing it will simply mean that oblivion to the current status of market would still be thought of as the best form of defense while a change would mean a drop in the fed's now-famous anti-inflationary zeal.

So how do you tackle an ever weakening housing market, a consumer spending slowdown and and highly shaken hedge funds (read:bear stearns) tied to subprime loans? How do you account for the amusingly 'vaccillatory' nature of the dow?

It's simple. You don't. Not unless you're a blue chip junkie whose uselessly placed his faith in the american stock bubble. And if you aren't, then i'll always maintain that it's best to sit back and watch events unfold.

wrt: NYT Aug 5th Andrew Sorkin

So what's the big deal about investment banking anyway. Do they deserve the astronomical fees that they command? Last year, Wall Street took in $8.5 billion in fees. The average bonus for a Goldman Sachs employee was $650,000!

So, in theory, companies hire investment banks for their insight, superior business acumen and what they hope will be a profit-maximizing strategy. How much of this happens in practice?
Perhaps the critic would choose to focus on the fact that a good $20-$30 million in a multi-billion dollar deal can hardly be considered significant enough but then, that's just really not the point is it?

Before you ask yourself the inane question of determining a quantitative method to judge advice, ask yourself this.How can you justify that amount of money for advice, when there remains every chance that the bank's strategy might not even be heeded in the long run. Never mind that, when AOL and Time Warner merge (or was that supposed to be about one acquiring the other?), is the deal based on what the hired investment bank wants? Apparently not.

Both the companies' chairmen, Steve Case and Gerald Levin had already agreed on the basic principles of the deal. So that relegates the bank's role to simply figuring out the execution (quite literally). The $164 billion deal had the country's top investment brains working behind it. When the strategy was already decided upon, does that justify the small percentage but astronomical amount that they receive as fees?

So the bottom line is to figure out what the primary role of the investment bank is, i.e: to strategize or to execute. It is only fair that accordingly then, the fees should be determined.
Needlessly running up the numbers, deal sizes and various commissions should not be the priority of a bank.